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This blog provides a summary of the policy memo, ‘The Interactions between State Budget
and Political Budget in Syria‘ published by the Con ict Research Programme.
Syrian bank teller counts money behind a counter. Credit : ILO/ Apex Image. 2010. Source:
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A new policy memo published by Con ict Research Programme shows that the Syrian regime
has increasingly used state budgets as a tool to reallocate resources for the bene t of
warlords and crony capitalists during the con ict. This abuse of public spending is one of the
different ways in which the regime can replenish its ‘political budget’, which refers to the
funds available by the ruler for discretionary spending to their elites to ensure their loyalty (de
Waal, 2016).
The dynamics of the state budget can help illuminate a two-level game in Syrian politics. The
 rst level represents the regime-populace bargain — a sort of social contract between the
authority and the citizens under which the latter have traded political rights and freedom for
economic bene ts and public goods. The second level is the ongoing intra-elite political game
in which the ruling group bargains with elites over how much access to resources they can
have in return for their support. These two ‘levels’ share an inverse relationship: when the
allocated amount for public goods and services increases, the elites’ access to government
spending decreases, and vice versa. The con ict in Syria, and the resulting lack of  nancial
resources accompanied with the regime’s total reliance on coercive measures to sustain its
authority has led it to adopt state budgets that prioritise the regime-elite bargain over the
regime-populace one. In other words, elites’ access to government spending has increased
whereas the allocated amount for public goods and services has largely decreased.
Elites, including traditional cronies and newly-emerged warlords, who made their fortunes
initially from con ict-related activities, access state budgets in two interlinked ways. The  rst
is through the corrupt relations between state o cials and businesspeople. This usually
involves relatively small amounts paid to evade tax, accelerate government procedures, etc.,
and is illegal by law. The second form is the legal access of business elites to public
resources, where the Syrian authorities have approved and facilitated this access. For
instance, these elites have monopolised the supply of basic goods within government-
controlled areas, in return for payments from the state budget. They have managed to use
their shadow companies outside Syria to overcome the impact of sanctions while importing
some of these goods to Syria. Due to their excessive margins of pro t, payments to these
companies consume a large part of public spending. In return, the elites have had to show
loyalty to the Syrian regime by providing  nancial, political and even military support, when
needed.
The supply of oil and oil derivatives is one example of how the government spending has
become a source for  nancing the political budget in regime-controlled areas. The Syrian
authority has met its oil and fuel needs from different sources. For example, the Syrian
authority has depended on in uential economic networks to obtain both imported oil and oil
transported from north east Syria. These networks have coordinated and negotiated with
businesspeople and key persons in north east Syria to transport oil to the regime- controlled
areas. They also have used their shadow companies outside Syria to secure the needed oil to
the Syrian government from external markets. It is worth mentioning that during the con ict,
shadow companies have proliferated, primarily to help the regime avoid sanctions post-2011.
The government has legalised the use of oil and oil derivatives trade to  nance the political
budget by signing formal contracts with private companies and businesspeople. These
contracts often include high pro t margins for the elites. For example, the Syrian authority is
paying an additional amount of 0.22 US dollar for each litre of fuel compared to the market
prices of fuel in neighbouring countries. With fuel consumption of 5.5 million litres per day,
this additional amount has been estimated at around 400 million US dollars per year, which is
almost equal to the total salaries of 1.5 million public workers in Syria. This shows how
funding the political budget in Syria directly contributes to amplifying the economic gap
between the elites and the majority of Syrians. For their part, elites pay high commissions for
licit and illicit international economic networks which they use to circumvent sanctions.
Hussam Katerji is an archetypal example of the warlords who are bene ting from state
budgets through legal contracts with the government. He is a Parliament member in
Damascus and owns the  Katerji Group which is involved in transporting oil from north east
Syria to the oil re neries in regime-controlled areas (Cornish, 2019). The Group also has a
shadow company in Lebanon which imports oil and fuel, mainly from Iran (Ibid). Moreover,
Katerji is one of the few bene ciaries of the privatisation of public services and entities in
Syria. For instance, early last year, President Assad approved the establishment of two private
oil re neries that were owned by one of the Katerji companies, noting that in regime-
controlled areas, there are only two public sector oil re neries.
In return, Katerji has had to prove his loyalty to the regime by providing political,  nancial, and
military support, when requested. The Katerji brothers have established their own militia in
the Deir-Ezzour governorate under the claim of protecting their investment in the area; yet,
this militia has been managed under the supervision of the regime security agencies (Winter,
2019). They have also maintained good connections and  nancial relations with tribal leaders
to facilitate their oil-related businesses and, politically, to keep these leaders under the
regime’s in uence (Ibid). Moreover, the Syrian authority uses Katerji brothers as one of the
intermediaries for its oil trade with Iran. At the same time, Iran is satis ed with their activities
as long as they channel some of the public funds to Iran for its political spending. This also
shows the increasing role of the external allies such as Iran, in the regime’s selection process
of its elites.
During the con ict, business elites have had increasing legal access to state budgets through
government procurement and contracts. This has further depleted already shrinking public
resources and has ampli ed the in uence of cronies and warlords at the expense of the
majority of Syrians. In return, the regime has expected these elites to play a vital role in
sustaining its authority by providing political,  nancial, and military support when needed.
However, the constantly escalating cost of maintaining support from the elites has decreased
the regime’s bargaining power with Syrians inside the country. To compensate for this weaker
bargaining position, the regime has moved towards greater use of coercion. Thus, within the
current Syrian context, the continued allocation of more resources for the bene t of political
elites will further diminish the possibility of establishing a fair and inclusive social contract.
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